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Abstract
This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which character-
izes network operators’ service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies.
Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we
examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly
market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator’s pricing effect on
the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. We provide a queueing delay
analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In
terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs
are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative
algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed
with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly
market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to
each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the
revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly
market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use
DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that
there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been emerging as a new approach for efficient
utilization of scarce wireless spectrum that is conventionally controlled via static licensing. DSA enables
secondary (unlicensed) users (SUs) to flexibly access underutilized legacy spectrum bands that are used
sporadically by primary (licensed) users (PUs) [1]. This idea of reusing the legacy spectrum is receiving
great supports thanks to the rapid development of software-defined radio and cognitive radio (CR)
technologies [2], which can vary parameters such as frequency, power, and modulation schemes through
software. Most DSA approaches [3], [4] are connected to a three-tier model of the dynamic spectrum
market in Fig. 1, which includes three network entities: spectrum owners, secondary network operators1
and CR-enabled SUs. The spectrum owner can temporarily lease their spectrum to the operators through
periodic auctions. In each period, the winning operators can provide secondary services for SUs via their
leased spectrum by charging an admission price to SUs for an economic return.
Among the various DSA approaches, opportunistic shared-use (i.e. spectrum overlay) and dynamic
exclusive-use models have been widely considered [3]–[5]. Opportunistic shared-use allows spectrum
owners employ “interruptible leasing” to operators, a model that forces operators to provide secondary
services without harming the operations of PUs on the leased spectrum. Dynamic exclusive-use, on
the other hand, allows spectrum owners to dynamically transfer spectrum-usage rights to operators, a
model that enables operators to lease parts of temporarily unused spectrum (i.e. no PUs operations) from
spectrum owners for secondary services provision.
In this paper, we study pricing-based spectrum access control of SUs by operators, which is shown
in the shaded region of Fig. 1. We consider two kinds of operators that employ the two different DSA
approaches of opportunistic shared-use and dynamic exclusive-use2, respectively. Their service provision
to SUs are controlled through pricing-based methods and are considered in three secondary-market types:
shared-use monopoly, exclusive-use monopoly, and duopoly pricing competition.
In the first monopoly market, by considering delay-sensitive SUs that share a PU’s single channel
controlled by a shared-use operator, we examine the effect of the operator’s pricing on the equilibrium
behaviors of non-cooperative SUs. This behavior is represented by a SU’s spectrum access decision upon
arrival, which entails either joining the list of other SUs that also want to share the same channel or
balking. In terms of SUs, we first introduce an individual optimal strategy employed by each SU as a
1For brevity, henceforth we will use only “operators”.
2For brevity, henceforth we will use only “shared-use” and “exclusive-use”.
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3Fig. 1. Three-tier dynamic spectrum market.
player in a non-cooperative game in order to make its spectrum access decision, based on a utility function
that captures the delay-sensitivity heterogeneity of SUs. We next show that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in this game. In order to employ the individual optimal strategy, each SU has to evaluate
its mean queueing delay of a virtual queue that is used to model a congestion effect that occurs when
many SUs intend to share the same PUs’ channel. By using the renewal theory, we provide a queueing
delay analysis based only on statistical information of the PUs’ activities and SUs’ service time. Finally,
we examine equilibrium dynamics through iterative algorithms and provide a sufficient condition for
equilibrium convergence. In terms of the operators, we devise two pricing mechanisms. For the case of
the operator being a commercial planner, we propose a revenue-optimal pricing policy to maximize the
operator’s revenue by solving a convex optimization problem. For the case of the operator being a social
planner, we propose a socially-optimal pricing policy to maximize network social welfare by solving an
equivalent convex problem.
In the second monopoly market, each entering delay-sensitive SU is allocated a dedicated channel from
a list of channels managed by an exclusive-use operator. Similarly to the first monopoly market, we also
study the effect of the operator’s pricing on the equilibrium behaviors of the non-cooperative SUs. Since
queueing delays of the SUs’ jobs are equal to their service time due to these dedicated channels, the
analytic results of the SU’s equilibrium behaviors, revenue-optimal pricing and socially-optimal pricing
can also be obtained in this market.
In the third duopoly market, we treat the competition between shared-use and exclusive-use operators
as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where two operators aim to maximize their revenues through pricing
and each SU will make its decision of which operators to join based on the prices charged by the
two operators. We first show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game. We then explore the
equilibrium dynamics via the iterative algorithms and provide a sufficient condition for the equilibrium
convergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is reviewed in Section II, and a system
model is described in Section III. We analyze the shared-use monopoly in Section IV, the exclusive-
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4use monopoly in Section V, and the duopoly market in Section VI. Numerical studies are provided in
Section VII. Finally, we conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There is an increasing interest in the three-tier model of the dynamic spectrum market, which consists
of interactions among spectrum owners, operators, and SUs [6]–[10]. However, the model of price-based
spectrum access control between operators and multiple SUs has attracted the interests. The studies in
[11]–[13] examined cases in which multiple operators compete for SUs, whereas [14] considered multiple
SUs competing to access operators’ channels. The authors of [15] considered short-term spectrum trading
across multiple PUs and SUs. [16] considered interactions between an operator and multiple SUs.
Nevertheless, most of these works focused on operators’ pricing and the responses of SUs via their
demand functions (e.g. the SUs’ required bandwidth). In this paper, we focus on the pricing mechanisms
and their impact on the equilibrium behaviors of SUs in a queueing system, which can be traced back
from the original work of [17], [18] and surveyed in the monograph [19]. To that end, there are many
works which attempt to balance between observable and unobservable queueing models. The observable
queue system [20]–[22] requires either a centralized control server or a feedback mechanism with time
overhead. In contrast, we use the unobservable queue system, which appropriately models the non-
cooperative and distributed nature of SUs where SUs have no information about each other. Recent work
on this paradigm of CR applications used server vacations or breakdowns in their queueing systems to
model the opportunistic shared-use approach [20], [23]. In [20], a queue was centrally controlled so that
the current queue length could be observed for the SU decision making process. This work also used a
discrete-time model where all distributions of arrivals and services were simply limited to a Bernoulli
distribution in order to facilitate analysis. The work in [23] used the unobservable and continuous-time
models; however, the inter-arrival times and services were restricted to the exponential distributions for
ease of analysis. Both papers also assumed homogeneous SUs and the Markovian channels to model the
PU traffic. Our work not only considers the heterogeneous SUs in terms of delay sensitivity, but also
provides a queueing model where the PUs’ channels and the service distributions of the SUs can be
general.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that there are two wireless network operators providing different DSA models. The first
operator, denoted by O1, uses the shared-use model, whereas the second operator, denoted by O2, employs
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or both of them (i.e. duopoly), which corresponds to three types of secondary markets (cf. Fig. 2). A
stream of SUs is assumed to arrive at the network and each of them will make a decision as to whether or
not to join an operator (in the case of a monopoly) or which operator to join (in the case of a duopoly).
A. SUs
We proceed to describe important parameters of the SUs.
1) Arrival Rates and Service Time: We assume that the SUs arrive at the network according to a Poisson
process with rate λ. Each SU is associated with a distinct job (e.g. a packet, session, or connection) that
it carries upon arrival. The service time to complete a job is represented by a random variable X with a
probability density function (pdf) fX(x). This service time is assumed to be independent of the arrival
process.
2) Delay-Sensitive User Types: Since the SUs are assumed to carry delay-sensitive traffic, each job
is attached to a specific application type characterized by a parameter θ. This parameter represents an
individual preference that reflects the delay sensitivity of the SU’s application. The value of θ varies across
job types, capturing SUs’ heterogeneity. Individual values of θ are private, but their cumulative distribution
function, denoted by FΘ(.), is known. We also assume that this parameter follows a uniform distribution
on [0, θup], which is common in the literature [24]–[26]. The relationship between θ and application types
is presented through some examples: many multimedia applications with stringent delay requirements will
have high values of θ; on the other hand, applications with θ equal to zero are insensitive to delay.
3) Individual Utilities: The value θ of a SU is realized at the instant it arrives (not before). This so-
called type-θ SU then must make a decision: either join the network or balk. The utility of any balking
SU is set to zero. For a type-θ SU that joins operator Oi, its utility function is given by
Ui(θ) = V − θdi − ci, i = 1, 2. (1)
This utility function, which is widely used in the literature [25], [27], captures the balance between a
reward V and a total cost θdi+ci that a SU undertakes once it decides to join the system. The reward V ,
which is assumed to be independent of SUs’ application type, represents a benefit of a SU for accessing
the service [27]. The total cost consists of two elements: the admission price ci charged by Oi (i.e. the
SUs are price-takers), and the waiting cost θdi of a job that spends a delay di. In this waiting cost,
the parameter θ can be interpreted as a waiting cost per unit time, an interpretation that adheres to the
delay-sensitivity mindset of θ: a higher waiting cost per unit time induces more negative effects of the
November 11, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 2. Three secondary-market scenarios: (a) Shared-use Monopoly, (b) Exclusive-use Monopoly and (c) Duopoly.
delay, which shows more sensitivity to delay. We also assume that the unit of θ is chosen such that θdi
has the same unit of V − ci.
B. Shared-Use Operator (O1)
The operator O1 is assumed to own a single channel. This channel is licensed to legacy PUs, and is
shared opportunistically by multiple SUs based on an admission price charged by O1.
1) PUs: Traffic patterns of PUs on the licensed band can be modelled as an ON-OFF renewal process
alternating between ON (busy) and OFF (idle) periods. We model the sojourn times of the ON and OFF
periods as i.i.d. random variables Y and Z, with the pdf fY (y) and fZ(z), respectively. We assume that
the ON and OFF periods are independent with SUs’ arrival process and service time.
This ON-OFF process can be considered a channel model for the SU services. This model captures
the idle time period in which the SUs can utilize the channel without causing harmful interference to the
PUs. We note that this PU traffic model is more general than other Markov ON-OFF models in which
both busy and idle periods are restricted to the exponential distributions [20], [23], [28].
2) Steady-State Virtual Queue: Since many SUs may attempt to share the same licensed channel,
congestion can occur, which will clearly affect the delay of each SU job. Therefore, when a SU job
arrives, it will evaluate its job’s delay in a queue containing other SU jobs that also wish to use that
licensed channel. This queue is only a virtual queue because each SU cannot observe how many other
jobs are waiting before its job (since SUs cannot know how many other SUs are trying to share the
licensed channel). Therefore, each SU forms a virtual queue based on the statistical information of λ,
fX(x), fY (y) and fZ(z), which are assumed to be estimated by existing methods [30], to assess the
mean queueing delay that its newly arrived job incurs. There are also many proposals in the CR literature
which use the concept of virtual queue to model the congestion effect [23], [29] in different contexts.
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queueing system (cf. Fig. 2a) whose service time has a general distribution dictated by fX(x), fY (y)
and fZ(z) since a SU service occuring in OFF periods can be interrupted by the returning of PUs in
ON periods. We denote E [T (λ)] the mean steady-state queueing delay (i.e. waiting time + service time)
induced by an arrival rate λ. From (1), the utility of a type-θ SU with O1 is
U1(θ) = V − θE [T (λ)]− c1. (2)
C. Exclusive-Use Operator (O2)
The operator O2 is assumed to obtain (i.e. via leasing) the part of spectrum which is temporarily
unused by the spectrum owner. This spectrum chunk is divided into multiple bands that have the same
bandwidth as the single band of O1. Since there is no PU traffic on these bands, SU services are not
interrupted in this case.
Whenever an arriving SU decides to join O2, the operator allocates a dedicated channel for the SU.
We assume that O2 always has enough dedicated bands to serve the SUs3. Therefore, we can consider
O2 to be an M/G/∞ queueing system (cf. Fig. 2b) where queueing delays of all SUs are equal to E [X].
From (1), the utility of a type-θ SU with O2 is
U2(θ) = V − θE [X]− c2. (3)
IV. TYPE I: SHARED-USE MONOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we first investigate the SUs’ strategies with the mean queueing delay analysis, the
Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium convergence. We then examine the O1’s optimal pricing policies
in terms of the revenue and social maximization.
A. SUs’ Strategies
1) Nash Equilibrium: We consider a stream of self-optimizing arriving SUs, which are concerned
only with their own benefits. In the game theory context, the potential SUs behave like players in a
non-cooperative game, and the decisions regarding joining or balking are their strategies. Specifically,
upon arrival, each type-θ SU has to make a decision based on the joining probability p(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. Given
the joining rule {p(θ), θ ≥ 0}, the unconditional probability that a potential SU joins the monopoly O1
3This assumption can be relaxed by “borrowing” more channels from other homogeneous operators when O2 lacks the
dedicated channels [4].
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8is p1 =
∫∞
0 p(θ)dFΘ(θ). With this joining rule, the actual arrival rate to the system is λp1. Because λ
is fixed, we denote queueing delay by E [T (p1)] rather than E [T (λp1)] for ease of presentation.
Since SUs are self-optimizing, each type-θ SU will choose its joining probability p(θ) to maximize its
expected utility p(θ)U1(θ) + (1−p(θ))0, which corresponds to the following individual optimal strategy.
Definition 1. An individually-optimizing type-θ SU that has U1(θ) = V − θE [T (p1)]− c1 will join O1
• with probability p(θ) = 1 if U1(θ) > 0, which requires
θ < θ1(p1), where θ1(p1) ,
V − c1
E [T (p1)]
, (4)
• with probability p(θ) = 0, otherwise.
Condition (4) states that when all SUs employ the individual optimal strategy, only a fraction of SUs
that have θ values less than θ1(p1) will join the O1. Since the unconditional joining probability p1 can
be considered to be the fraction of SUs that join O1, we have
p1 =
∫ ∞
0
p(θ)dFΘ(θ) =
∫ θ1(p1)
0
dFΘ(θ) = FΘ
(
θ1(p1)
)
. (5)
Therefore, the equilibrium of the SUs’ joining probability to O1 is defined as follows.
Definition 2. p∗1 is a Nash equilibrium of SUs’ joining probability in a shared-use monopoly if it satisfies
p∗1 = FΘ
(
θ1(p
∗
1)
)
. (6)
This definition shows that once reaching an equilibrium, the fraction of joining SUs remains the same
hereafter. The equilibrium p∗1 is called a Nash equilibrium if at this point, no SU has any incentive to
deviate from its strategy assuming that all other SUs continue to follow their strategies. The following
theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, of which the proof is provided
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. For a given admission price c1, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the SUs’ joining
probability p∗1 in a shared-use monopoly market.
2) Queueing Delay Analysis: In order to perform its individual optimal strategy, each SU must estimate
the mean queueing delay, which will be analyzed in the sequel.
We assume that a SU can use its spectrum sensing and handoff capabilities to detect and protect
the PUs, respectively. Spectrum sensing is used to inform the SU whether the channel is busy or idle.
Moreover, sensing errors are assumed to be negligible. When the channel is sensed to be idle, the SU job
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Fig. 3. A sample ON-OFF process with a realization of an effective service time Xe where its original SU service time is
increased because of three interruptions from ON periods Y1, Y2 and Y3.
can be in service. When the channel is sensed to be busy, the spectrum handoff procedure is performed
to return the channel to the PUs. This kind of the listen-before-talk channel access scheme has been
adopted in the quiet period technique of the IEEE 802.22 standard [31]. During the service time of a SU
job, it is likely that the SU must perform multiple spectrum handoffs due to multiple interruptions from
the returns of PUs, represented by ON periods. Spectrum handoffs, which are employed to protect PU
traffic and to provide reliable SU services, help SUs vacate the channel during ON periods and resume
their unfinished services after ON periods end. Clearly, in the case of multiple spectrum handoffs, the
original service time X of the SU job is increased, as illustrated in Fig. 3, and this increased service
time is called the effective service time and is denoted by a random variable Xe.
We begin the analysis by denoting E [W (p1)] the mean waiting time in the M/G/1 queueing system
whose mean service time and arrival rate are E [Xe] and λp1, respectively. According to the Pollaczek-
Khinchin formula [32], the mean waiting time is
E [W (p1)] =
λp1E
[
X2e
]
2(1− λp1E [Xe]) . (7)
Using the mean value analysis in [32], we have the extended-value mean queueing delay as follows
E [T (p1)] =
E [W (p1)] +E [Xe] , if λp1 < 1/E [Xe] ;∞, otherwise. (8)
This extended-value queueing delay can eliminate the explicit condition λp1 < 1/E [Xe] in our arguments
hereafter. The problem boils down to how to derive E [Xe] and E
[
X2e
]
, the first and second moments
of the effective service time, respectively, in order to estimate the mean queueing delay. We proceed to
use the renewal theory to derive these moments based on the statistical information of the SU service
time and the ON-OFF process.
The First Moment of Effective Service Time. Defining a random variable, N(X), as the number of
November 11, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 4. Mean queueing delay performance comparison: (a) heavy PU traffic model, (b) light PU traffic model.
renewals (i.e. ON periods) occurring in the interval (0, X), we have
E [Xe] = E
[
X +
∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
]
= E [X] +E
[∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
]
= E [X] +E [Y ]E [N(X)] , (9)
where the final equality occurs because Y is independent of X . From [33, pp. 45], we have
E
[
N(X)
∣∣ X = x] = x
E [Z]
. (10)
As a consequence, E [N(X)] = E[X]E[Z] , which is then substituted into (9) so as to obtain
E [Xe] = E [X]
(
1 +
E [Y ]
E [Z]
)
. (11)
The Second Moment of Effective Service Time. We continue with
E
[
X2e
]
= E
[(
X +
∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
)2]
= E
[
X2
]
+ 2E
[
X
∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
]
+E
[(∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
)2]
. (12)
Using the law of iterated expectations, the second term of the right side of (12) can be shown to be
E
[
X
∑N(X)
i=1
Yi | X = x
]
= xE [N(x)Y ] = xE [N(x)]E [Y ] = x2
E [Y ]
E [Z]
, (13)
where we have the second equality because of the independence between Y and N(x). Hence, we obtain
E
[
X
∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
]
= E
[
X2
] E [Y ]
E [Z]
. (14)
Next, we derive the third term on the right side of (12) as follows
E
[(∑N(X)
i=1
Yi
)2]
= E
[∑N(X)
i=1
Y 2i
]
+E
 ∑
{(i,j)|i 6=j}
YiYj

= E [N(X)]E
[
Y 2
]
+E [Y ]2E
[(
N(X)− 1)N(X)] . (15)
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We define g(X | X = x) , E [(N(X)− 1)N(X) ∣∣ X = x] and denote the Laplace transform of an
arbitrary function f(x) by f∗(s). Using the similar technique of deriving the variance of the number of
renewals in [33, pp. 55], we can easily obtain the following result
g∗(s) =
2
s2E [Z]
f∗Z(s)
1− f∗Z(s)
. (16)
An inverse Laplace transform can then be applied to g∗(s) so as to obtain g(x). Therefore, g(X) can be
found correspondingly. From (12), (14), and (15), we can see that E
[
X2e
]
is completely derived.
Examples with Analysis and Simulation Comparisons. We supplement the queueing delay analysis
through a performance comparison of the analysis and simulation by the following five examples.
(a) X,Y and Z all have the exponential distributions with fX(x) = µXe−µXx, fY (y) = µone−µony and
fZ(z) = µoffe
−µoffz , respectively. This combination is termed Exp, and we obtain
E [Xe] =
1
µX
(
1 +
µoff
µon
)
, (17)
E
[
X2e
]
=
2µ2off
µ2onµ
2
X
+
2µoff
µ2onµX
+
4µoff
µonµ2X
+
2
µ2X
. (18)
(b) X,Y and Z all have the Erlang distributions with fX(x) = µ2Xxe
−µXx, fY (y) = µ2onye−µony and
fZ(z) = µ
2
offze
−µoffz , respectively. This combination is termed Erl, and we obtain
E [Xe] =
2
µX
(
1 +
µoff
µon
)
, (19)
E
[
X2e
]
=
6µoff
µ2onµX
+
12µoff
µonµ2X
+
6
µ2X
+
8µ3off(3µoff + 2µX)
µ2onµ
2
X(2µoff + µX)
2
. (20)
(c) X is uniformly distributed on [xlo, xup], whereas Y and Z have the exponential distributions with
fY (y) = µone
−µony and fZ(z) = µoffe−µoffz , respectively. This example is termed UniExp, and we
obtain
E [Xe] =
xlo + xup
2
(
1 +
µoff
µon
)
, (21)
E
[
X2e
]
=
N
48µoffµ2on(xup − xlo)
, (22)
where N = (x3up − x3lo)(4µ3off + 16µ2offµon + 16µoffµ2on) + 42µ2off(x2up − x2lo) + 6µoff(xup − xlo) +
3(e−2µoffxlo − e−2µoffxup).
(d) X has the Erlang distribution with fX(x) = µ2Xxe
−µXx, whereas Y and Z have the exponential
distributions with fY (y) = µone−µony and fZ(z) = µoffe−µoffz , respectively. This combination is
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termed ErlExp, and we obtain
E [Xe] =
2
µX
(
1 +
µoff
µon
)
, (23)
E
[
X2e
]
=
6µ2off
µ2onµ
2
X
+
4µoff
µ2onµX
+
12µoff
µonµ2X
+
6
µ2X
. (24)
(e) X has the exponential distribution with fX(x) = µXe−µXx, whereas Y and Z have the Erlang
distributions with fY (y) = µ2onye
−µony and fZ(z) = µ2offze
−µoffz , respectively. This combination is
termed ExpErl, and we obtain
E [Xe] =
1
µX
(
1 +
µoff
µon
)
, (25)
E
[
X2e
]
=
4µ3off
µ2onµ
2
X(2µoff + µX)
+
3µoff
µ2onµX
+
4µoff
µonµ2X
+
2
µ2X
. (26)
In order to validate our queueing analysis, we simulate a single-server queue with service interruptions
for the performance comparison. In all five examples, we fix λ = 1 and vary p1 to adjust the traffic load
into the queue. We set µX = 1 for both Exp and Erl, µX = 1.5 for ErlExp, µX = 2/3 for ExpErl and
[xlo, xup] = [0.1, 1.9] for UniExp. The comparison between the analysis and the simulation is presented
in Fig. 4 in two scenarios: the left figure shows the results of the setting µon = 0.5 and µoff = 1.5,
which represents a heavy PU traffic model in urban areas, whereas the right figure shows the results of
the setting µon = 1.5 and µoff = 0.5, which represents a light PU traffic model in rural areas. Despite the
variation in numerical settings, Fig. 4 shows that the analysis results are very similar to the simulation
results.
3) Equilibrium Convergence: We focus on the algorithm and condition for the convergence of the
equilibrium joining probability p∗1. We assume that the system operates over successive time periods
labeled t = 0, 1, 2 . . .. The arrival rate is λpt1 during a period t, which is assumed to last long enough for
the system to attain the steady state. Since the mean queueing delay varies with the joining probability
of the SUs, each type-θ SU will make a joining decision in the next time instant t + 1 by forming a
prediction of the queueing delay denoted by Tˆ t+1. Hence, this SU will join the network at period t+ 1
if and only if V > θTˆ t+1 + c1. One of possible prediction techniques is every SU expects that the mean
queueing delay in the next period is equal to that in the current period: Tˆ t+1 = E
[
T (pt1)
]
. Defining
q(pt1) , FΘ
(
θ1(p
t
1)
)
, we describe the dynamics of SUs’ joining probability via two iterative algorithms,
namely static expectations and adaptive expectations [34], of which the SUs’ joining probability evolves
as follows, respectively
pt+11 = q(p
t
1) (27)
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and
pt+11 = (1− α)pt1 + αq(pt1), (28)
where α ∈ (0, 1]. We can see that the adaptive method is reduced to the static method when α = 1. The
static method is also called the naive expectations method [34] because it assumes that each SU ignores
similar actions of the others. In order to alleviate shortcomings of the static expectations, the adaptive
expectations method – with the intuition that only α fraction of SUs make decisions to change at a given
time – allows SUs to learn from and correct for past errors. We obtain the following result which is
proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. With any starting point p01 ∈ [0, 1] and an α ∈ (0, 1], the sufficient condition for the
equilibrium convergence of the SUs’ joining probability dynamics in (28) is
E′ [T (1)]
E [T (1)]
<
1
α
. (29)
If λ < 1/E [Xe], we can always find a sufficiently small α such that the convergence of the equilibrium
is guaranteed globally. If λ ≥ 1/E [Xe], this condition is always violated because the left side of (29)
goes to ∞. However, this is a sufficient condition, which does not imply that the equilibrium diverges
when it is violated. It may still converge locally when the starting point is in a neighborhood of the
equilibrium. We will illustrate this effect in the numerical section.
B. Optimal Pricing Mechanisms of O1
The main focus of this subsection is the operator’s use of pricing as a way to maximize its revenue
as well as the social welfare of the CR system.
1) Revenue-Optimal Pricing: When charging a price c1,O1 can attain an equilibrium revenue R1(c1) ,
c1 p
∗
1(c1), where p
∗
1(c1) is the equilibrium at price c1 defined in (6). The problem of finding the revenue-
optimal price cR1 that maximizes O1’s equilibrium revenue can then be expressed as
max.
c1∈[clo,cup]
R1(c1). (30)
Based on (6), (7), and (8), we obtain
p∗1(c1) =

0, if c1 ≥ cup,
1, if c1 ≤ clo,
−√Π+E[Xe](λ(V−c1)+θup)
λθup(2E[Xe]2−E[X2e ])
, otherwise,
(31)
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where
cup = V, (32)
clo = max {0, V − θupE [T (1)]}, (33)
Π = 2λθup(V − c1)E
[
X2e
]
+E [Xe]
2
(
λ(c1 − V ) + θup
)2
. (34)
From (31), we can see that R1(c1) is a concave function; hence, the solution cR1 of the problem (30)
can be solved efficiently. When O1 uses this cR1 for admission pricing and all SUs employ the individual
optimal strategy, the corresponding equilibrium joining probability will be p∗1(cR1 ).
2) Socially-Optimal Pricing: Network social welfare is considered to be the aggregate utility obtained
by all SUs. When O1 charges a price c1, at the equilibrium, only the SUs with θ < θ1(p∗1(c1)) that join
the CR network have positive utilities according to (4). Therefore, the network social welfare at price c1
is expressed as follows
S1(c1) =
∫ θ1(p∗1(c1))
0
(
V − θE [T (p∗1(c1))]
)
dFΘ(θ), (35)
where θ1(p∗1(c1)) is the cut-off SU at price c1. The socially-optimal pricing problem can then be cast as
max.
c1∈[clo,cup]
S1(c1). (36)
However, solving this problem is difficult due to the complex functions θ1(p∗1(c1)) and p∗1(c1). Observing
that
p∗1(c1) = FΘ
(
θ1(p
∗
1(c1))
)
=
θ1(p
∗
1(c1))
θup
, (37)
we instead change the choice of variable from c1 to a cut-off SU variable denoted by θ˜1. Then the new
objective function is
S1(θ˜1) =
∫ θ˜1
0
(
V − θE
[
T
(
θ˜1/θup
)])
dFΘ(θ) = V
θ˜1
θup
− θ˜
2
1
2θup
E
[
T
(
θ˜1/θup
)]
. (38)
Hence, an equivalent maximization problem of (36) is as follows
max.
θ˜1≥0
S1
(
θ˜1
)
. (39)
We can observe that S1(θ˜1) is concave in its domain; hence, the solution of (39), denoted by θS1 , can be
solved efficiently. Then, from (4), the socially-optimal price cS1 can be calculated as
cS1 = V − θS1 E
[
T (θS1/θup)
]
. (40)
When O1 uses this cS1 for admission pricing and all SUs employ the individual optimal strategy, the
corresponding equilibrium joining probability will be p∗1(cS1).
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V. TYPE II: EXCLUSIVE-USE MONOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we first investigate the SUs’ strategies and the Nash equilibrium. We then examine the
O2’s optimal pricing policies in terms of the revenue and social maximization.
A. SUs’ Strategies
The self-optimizing behaviors of SUs are similar to those in Section IV, where the strategy of each
type-θ SU is characterized by its joining probability p(θ). Given the joining rule {p(θ), θ ≥ 0}, the
unconditional probability that a potential arriving SU joins the monopoly O2 is p2 =
∫∞
0 p(θ)dFΘ(θ).
Since a self-optimizing type-θ SU will choose p(θ) to maximize its expected utility p(θ)U2(θ) + (1 −
p(θ))0, we have the individual optimal strategy of a SU in an exclusive-use monopoly as follows.
Definition 3. An individually-optimizing type-θ SU that has U2(θ) = V − θE [X]− c2 will join O2
• with probability p(θ) = 1 if U2(θ) > 0, which requires
θ < θ∗2, where θ
∗
2 ,
V − c2
E [X]
, (41)
• with probability p(θ) = 0, otherwise.
Therefore, the equilibrium of the SUs’ joining probability to O2 is defined as follows.
Definition 4. p∗2 is a Nash equilibrium of SUs’ joining probability in an exclusive-use monopoly if it
satisfies
p∗2 =
∫ ∞
0
p(θ)dFΘ(θ) =
∫ θ∗2
0
dFΘ(θ) = FΘ
(
θ∗2
)
. (42)
It is clear that, for a given admission price c2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the SUs’ joining
probability p∗2.
B. Optimal Pricing Mechanisms of O2
1) Revenue-Optimal Pricing: When charging a price c2,O2 can attain an equilibrium revenue R2(c2) ,
c2 p
∗
2(c2), where p
∗
2(c2) is the equilibrium at price c2 found in (42). It is clear that the revenue-optimal
price of O2 is cR2 = V2 , which is the solution of the problem max.
c2∈[0,V ]
R2(c2).
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2) Socially-Optimal Pricing: The network social welfare is expressed as follows
S2(c2) =
∫ θ∗2 (c2)
0
(
V − θE [X]) dFΘ(θ) = V θ∗2(c2)
θup
−
(
θ∗2(c2)
)2
2θup
E [X] , (43)
where θ∗2(c2) is a cut-off SU at the price c2 according to (41). It is clear that the socially-optimal price
of O2 is cS2 = 0, which is the solution of the problem max.
c2∈[0,V ]
S2(c2).
VI. TYPE III: DUOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we consider a duopoly market in a CR network where both O1 and O2 compete with
each other in terms of pricing in order to maximize their revenues. Based on the prices set by the two
operators, a θ-type SU will decide either to join one or to balk to maximize its utility. This duopoly model
is illustrated in Fig. 2c. The relationship between operators and SUs can be seen as a leader-follower
game that can be studied using the two-stage Stackelberg game. Specifically, the operators are the leaders
that simultaneously set the prices in Stage I, then SUs will make the joining decisions in Stage II.
A. Backward Induction for the Two-Stage Game
We examine the subgame perfect equilibrium of this Stackelberg game by using a common approach:
the backward induction method [35], [36]. The equilibrium behaviors of the SUs in Stage II will be
analyzed first. Then, we investigate how operators determine their prices in Stage I based on the SUs’
equilibrium behaviors.
1) SUs’ Strategies in Stage II: In this stage, when two operators are present in the network and set
the prices (c1, c2), each type-θ SU upon arrival will have to choose one of three possible options: join
O1, join O2, or join neither. We denote p1(c1, c2) and p2(c1, c2) as the fraction of SUs that join O1 and
O2, respectively. Henceforth, we simply use the notation p1 and p2. We also define an indifference SU
as follows
θ¯(p1) ,
c2 − c1
E [T (p1)]−E [X] . (44)
Each SU is assumed to be a rational decision maker in that it only chooses one operator to join if its
utility with this operator is both positive and higher than that with the other operator, which corresponds
to the following individual optimal strategy.
Definition 5. An individually-optimizing type-θ SU that has U1(θ) = V − θE [T (p1)]− c1 with O1 and
U2(θ) = V − θE [X]− c2 with O2, where U1(θ¯(p1)) = U2(θ¯(p1)), will join
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• O1 with probability p(θ) = 1 if U1(θ) > U2(θ) and U1(θ) > 0, which requires
θ < θ¯(p1) and θ < θ1(p1), (45)
• O2 with probability p(θ) = 1 if U2(θ) > U1(θ) and U2(θ) > 0, which requires
θ¯(p1) < θ < θ
∗
2, (46)
• neither with probability p(θ) = 1 if U1(θ) < 0 and U2(θ) < 0, which requires
θ > θ1(p1) and θ > θ∗2. (47)
Recall that θ1(p1) and θ∗2 are given in (4) and (41), respectively. Based on (45), (46) and (47), the
unconditional joining probabilities (p1, p2) are as follows
(p1, p2) =
(∫ min{θ1(p1), θ¯(p1)}
0
dFΘ(θ),
∫ θ∗2
θ¯(p1)
dFΘ(θ)
)
. (48)
With the time slot model as in Subsection IV-A3 and according to (48), the SUs’ joining probability
dynamics in the duopoly can be described as follows
(a) If θ¯
(
pt1
)
< 0, which leads to c2 < c1 since E
[
T
(
pt1
)]
> E [X] , ∀t, then O1 is eliminated from the
competition, leaving O2 as a monopoly. We have
(
pt+11 , p
t+1
2
)
=
(
0, FΘ (θ
∗
2)
)
, ∀t. (49)
(b) If 0 < θ¯
(
pt1
)
< θ∗2, which leads to θ∗2 < θ1(pt1), then we have(
pt+11 , p
t+1
2
)
=
(
FΘ
(
θ¯
(
pt1
))
, FΘ (θ
∗
2)− FΘ
(
θ¯
(
pt1
)))
. (50)
(c) If θ¯
(
pt1
)
> θ∗2, which leads to θ∗2 > θ1(pt1), then O2 is eliminated from the competition, leaving O1
as a monopoly. We have
(
pt+11 , p
t+1
2
)
=
(
FΘ
(
θ1
(
pt1
))
, 0
)
. (51)
Since there exists a sufficiently small  and the corresponding p , min{1, 1λE[Xe] − } such that
pt1 ≤ p,∀t, (52)
we define an equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2) in a duopoly market with the given prices (c1, c2) as follows.
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Definition 6. Given a sufficient small , (p∗1, p∗2) is a Nash equilibrium of SUs’ joining probability in a
duopoly market if it satisfies
(p∗1, p
∗
2) =

(
0, FΘ (θ
∗
2)
)
, if θ¯(p) < 0,(
FΘ
(
θ¯(p∗1)
)
, FΘ (θ
∗
2)− FΘ
(
θ¯(p∗1)
))
, if 0 < θ¯(p) < θ∗2,(
FΘ (θ1(p
∗
1)) , 0
)
, if θ¯(p) > θ∗2.
(53)
We have the following result which is proved in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. For a given admission price pair (c1, c2), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the
SUs’ joining probability (p∗1, p∗2) satisfying (53) in a duopoly market.
We can see that both θ¯(p) < 0 and θ¯(p) > θ∗2 correspond to the equilibrium behaviors of the shared-
use and exclusive-use monopolies in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Therefore, we will focus
only in the case 0 < θ¯(p) < θ∗2 in what follows.
Regarding the convergence of the equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2), the static expectations method is presented in
(50). The adaptive expectations method can also be presented as follows
pt+1 = (1− α)pt + αqd(pt), (54)
where α ∈ (0, 1], pt = (pt1, pt2) and
qd(p
t) ,
(
FΘ
(
θ¯
(
pt1
))
, FΘ (θ
∗
2)− FΘ
(
θ¯
(
pt1
)))
. (55)
We obtain the following result which is proved in Appendix D.
Theorem 4. With any starting point (p01, p02) ∈ [0, 1]2 and an α ∈ (0, 1], the sufficient condition for the
equilibrium convergence of the SUs’ joining probability dynamics (54) is
E′ [T (1)]
E [T (1)]−E [X] <
1
α
. (56)
Since the left side of (56) is strictly greater than that of (29), we see that the equilibrium convergence
condition of a duopoly in (56) is more stringent than that of the shared-use monopoly in (29).
2) Price Competition in Stage I: In this stage, the operators determine their pricing strategies based
on (p∗1, p∗2) in Stage II. Given a pair of prices (c1, c2), the equilibrium revenue of the operator i is
Ri(c1, c2) = cip
∗
i , i = 1, 2. (57)
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Here, (p∗1, p∗2) is given in (53) in the case of the duopoly coexistence with 0 < θ¯(p) < θ∗2, which
corresponds to the condition
c1 < c2 < u(c1), (58)
where
u(c1) ,
V
(
E [T (p)]−E [X])+E [X] c1
E [T (p)]
. (59)
The competition between two operators in Stage I can then be modelled as the following game
• Players: O1 and O2,
• Strategy: O1 chooses price c1 ∈ (0, c2); O2 chooses price c2 ∈ (0, u(c1)),
• Payoff function: Ri(c1, c2), i = 1, 2.
We denote the Stage I game equilibrium by (c∗1, c∗2), and define p
~
i , p∗i (c∗1, c∗2), i = 1, 2.
Theorem 5. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of a Stage I game such that
(c∗1, c
∗
2) =
(
V
(
E
[
T (p~1 )
]−E [X])
4E
[
T (p~1 )
]−E [X] , 2V
(
E
[
T (p~1 )
]−E [X])
4E
[
T (p~1 )
]−E [X]
)
(60)
where
p~1 =
2V√
∆ +E [Xe] (λV + 3θup)
with ∆ = E [Xe]
2 (λV − 3θup)2 + 8θupλV E
[
X2e
]
. (61)
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix E. We then examine whether (c∗1, c∗2) satisfies the
condition (58) or not. Since the lower bound of (58) is clearly satisfied, we check the upper bound
condition c∗2 < u(c∗1), which is equivalent to the following inequality after some algebra manipulations
2E
[
T (p~1 )
]
E [T (p)] > E [X]
(
3E
[
T (p~1 )
]−E [T (p)]). (62)
It turns out that (62) is true since E [T (p)] > E [X] and E [T (p)] ≥ E [T (p~1 )].
B. Equilibrium Summary
We summarize all equilibrium cases in Table I. Since O2 has dedicated channels for SUs and provides
less delay than that of O1, it is intuitive that O2 becomes a monopolist when c1 > c2. However, if O2’s
price is much higher than O1’s in case of c2 > u(c1), then O1 becomes a monopolist. Only in the case
of c1 < c2 < u(c1), both operators can share the market and the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
of the Stackelberg game is
(
(c∗1, c∗2), (p
~
1 , p
~
2 )
)
. To attain this equilibrium, the operators first update the
statistical information of SUs and PUs to calculate (c∗1, c∗2) according to (60) and broadcast. Based on
these prices, the SUs then employ the individual optimal strategy, inducing the result (p~1 , p
~
2 ).
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TABLE I
EQUILIBRIUM SUMMARY
Pricing space c1 > c2 c1 < c2 < u(c1) c2 > u(c1)
Equilibrium O2 monopoly Nash equilibrium
(p∗1, p
∗
2) =
(
0, FΘ (θ
∗
2)
) Duopoly subgame perfect
equilibrium
(
(c∗1, c
∗
2), (p
~
1 , p
~
2 )
) O1 monopoly Nash equilibrium
(p∗1, p
∗
2) =
(
FΘ (θ1(p
∗
1)) , 0
)
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Fig. 5. O1’s revenues (top plot) and SUs’ equilibrium joining probabilities (bottom plot) as functions of the admission price.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we apply the analysis results to numerically illustrate the SUs’ equilibrium behaviors
and the optimal pricing strategies in the O1 monopoly market first, and then the interaction between O1
and O2 in the duopoly market. To facilitate the illustration, the parameter settings adhere to the following
order of Exp, Erl, UniExp, ErlExp and ExpErl examples with light PU traffic model (i.e. µon = 1.5 and
µoff = 0.5) in Section IV-A2. Furthermore, we set V = 1, θup = 1, α = 0.3, and  = 0.01.
A. Shared-Use Monopoly
1) Revenue Optimization: The top part of Fig. 5 shows graphs of O1’s revenue with respect to price c1.
We can see that the revenue functions have convex forms and their maximum values are achieved nearly
at the same price (0.58) with the corresponding revenues 0.13, 0.07, 0.14, 0.1 and 0.08 with respect to
the order of the example settings. At c1 = 0 and c1 = V = 1, all revenues are zero, which is clear due to
the revenue function and the individual optimal strategy definitions. The equilibrium joining probability
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Fig. 6. The network social welfare as functions of the cut-off SUs.
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Fig. 7. The convergence of equilibrium joining probabilities p∗1(cR1) and p∗1(cS1) with static expectations (left plot) and adaptive
expectations (right plot).
p∗1(c1) is plotted in the bottom part of Fig. 5. At the price cR1 = 0.58, we can see that the corresponding
p∗1(cR1 ) are 0.21, 0.11, 0.23, 0.17 and 0.14 with respect to the order of example settings. This plot also
demonstrates that when c1 is increased, p∗1(c1) is decreased.
2) Social Optimization: The network social welfare as a function of cut-off user θ˜1 is shown in
Fig. 6. It can be seen that the socially-optimal cut-off SUs θS1 are 0.3, 0.16, 0.33, 0.25 and 0.21, and the
November 11, 2018 DRAFT
22
0 5 10 15 20 25
iterations
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
∗ 1
cS1
cR1
0 5 10 15 20 25
iterations
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
cS1
cR1
Fig. 8. p∗1(cR1) and p∗1(cS1) converge locally (left plot) and globally (right plot) when the condition in (29) is violated and
satisfied, respectively.
corresponding socially-optimal values S1(θS1) are 0.19, 0.1, 0.21, 0.16 and 0.13 with respect to the order
of the example settings. The respective socially-optimal prices cS1 can be calculated according to (40).
Compared with the bottom plot of Fig. 5, these prices map correctly with the corresponding values of
p∗1(cS1), which is equal to θS1 since θup = 1.
3) Equilibrium Convergence Dynamics: With the starting point p01 set to zero, the equilibrium conver-
gence of all settings using static and adaptive expectations are illustrated in Fig. 7. Although the condition
in (29) is violated in all five settings (i.e. λ > 1/E [Xe]), it can still be seen that all joining probabilities
converge to the expected equilibrium points presented previously as Theorem 2 gives a sufficient but not
necessary condition.
In Fig. 8, we examine the local and global convergence when the condition in (29) is violated and
satisfied, respectively. With the Exp setting, the left plot of Fig. 8 shows that the equilibria p∗1(cR1 ) and
p∗1(cS1) can converge if we choose the starting points in the range of [0, 0.75]. We observe that if the starting
point is larger than 0.76, the divergence occurs. The right plot of Fig. 8 shows the global convergence
of the equilibria p∗1(cR1 ) and p∗1(cS1) in a new setting that is the same as the Exp setting except that the
parameter µX is changed to 2, inducing the condition in (29) is satisfied with α = 0.3.
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B. Duopoly
We continue to illustrate the price competition between O1 and O2. We first consider the effect of the
Stage I’s equilibrium (c∗1, c∗2) on the Stage II’s equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2). From (60), the equilibrium values are
(c∗1, c∗2) = (0.13, 0.26), (0.19, 0.38), (0.11, 0.22), (0.16, 0.32) and (0.18, 0.36) with respect to the order of
example settings. With these equilibrium prices, the corresponding (p∗1, p∗2) convergence of all settings is
shown in Fig. 9a.
We next illustrate the tendency of a duopoly to form a monopoly if the condition in (58) is violated.
We first choose a price pair that is close to the upper bound of this condition, where c1 = cR1 = 0.58
and c2 = 0.99u(c1). Fig. 9b shows that with this price pair, the p∗2 of all settings converges closely to 0,
whereas p∗1 converges closely to the equilibrium in the O1 monopoly shown in Fig. 5. We then choose
a price pair that is close to the lower bound of the condition in (58), where c2 is set arbitrarily to 0.5
and c1 = 0.99 c2. With this price pair, as shown in Fig. 9c, the p∗1 of all settings converges closely to
0, whereas p∗2 of all settings converges closely to FΘ (θ∗2) =
0.5
E[X] , the equilibrium joining probability of
the O2 monopoly.
The data shown in Fig. 9 not only validate our analysis of the price competition of a duopoly, but also
provide the convergence behaviors of different methods. In Fig. 9, all the graphs in the left column show
the convergence with the adaptive expectations method, whereas the graphs in the right column show the
convergence with the static expectations method.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper describes the price-based spectrum access control between the operators and SUs in three
market scenarios. The interactions between the first monopolist operator with shared-use DSA and delay-
sensitive SUs is examined through a queueing analysis representing the SU’s congestion due to the shared
single channel. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where
the SUs are the players employing individual optimal strategies for spectrum access. We also provide a
sufficient condition and the iterative algorithms for the equilibrium convergence. The pricing mechanisms
of the operators are also considered for two problems of revenue and social welfare maximization. The
second monopolist operator using exclusive-use DSA has many channels to dedicate to SUs. Owing to the
separate channels, the analysis of the interactions between the operator and the SUs is straightforward,
yet provides useful insights in the third market analysis. In the third duopoly market, we study the
price competition between two operators using shared-use and exclusive use DSA. We formulate this
competition as a two-stage Stackelberg game. The equilibrium behaviors of the SUs in Stage II are
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analyzed first, and we then examine how operators determine their prices in Stage I based on the SUs’
behaviors. Using the backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium in this
game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Defining Φ(p1) , FΘ (θ1(p1))−p1 with
p1 ∈ [0, 1], we can see that Φ(p1) is a strictly decreasing function because FΘ(.) is an increasing function
and θ1(p1) is a strictly decreasing function (since E [T (p1)] is strictly increasing) on their domains. By
Definition 2, p∗1 is an equilibrium if and only if it is a root of Φ(p1). Hence, it suffices to show that
Φ(p1) has a unique root on its domain as follows.
When V ≤ c1, we clearly see that p∗1 = 0 is the unique root of Φ(p1).
When V ≥ c1 + θupE [T (1)], we clearly see that p∗1 = 1 is the unique root of Φ(p1).
When c1 < V < c1 +E [T (1)] θup, we have two following cases
(a) There exists a p′1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
c1 < V = c1 +E
[
T (p′1)
]
θup < c1 +E [T (1)] θup, (63)
since E [T (p1)] is a strictly increasing function. Then we observe that
Φ(p1) = 1− p1 > 0, ∀p1 ∈ [0, p′1], (64)
Φ(1) = FΘ (θ1(1))− 1 < 0. (65)
With (64), (65) and the fact that Φ(p1) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function, we see that
Φ(p1) has a unique root p∗1 ∈ (p′1, 1) in this case.
(b) If there does not exist any p′ satisfying (63), then we have c1 < V < c1 +E [T (p1)] θup, ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1].
We observe that
Φ(0) = FΘ (θ1(0)) > 0, (66)
Φ(1) = FΘ (θ1(1))− 1 < 0. (67)
With (66), (67) and the fact that Φ(p1) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function, we see that
Φ(p1) has a unique root p∗1 ∈ (0, 1) in this case.
Next, we show that this unique root is a Nash equilibrium. When all SUs experience the same mean
queueing delay E [T (p∗1)], p∗1 will be a Nash equilibrium if no SU of any type θ can increase its utility
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by choosing an entrance probability different from p(θ) in Definition 1. To see this, consider a specific
type-θ SU
(a) If V > θE [T (p∗1)] + c1, according to Definition 1, this SU will join with probability p(θ) = 1;
hence, its expected utility is V − θE [T (p∗1)] − c1 > 0. If this SU deviates from this individual
optimal strategy by choosing another strategy 0 ≤ p˜(θ) < 1, it will receive an expected utility
p˜(θ)(V − θE [T (p∗1)] + c1) < V − θE [T (p∗1)]− c1. Therefore, such a SU has no incentive to deviate
from its current strategy. Conversely, if such a SU chooses another strategy p˜(θ) < 1, it will find
that it can increase its expected utility by switching to p(θ) = 1.
(b) If V < θE [T (p∗1)] + c1, by deviating from the individual optimal strategy (i.e. p(θ) = 0), the SU
will receive a strictly smaller expected utility; hence, this SU has no incentive to deviate from its
current strategy.
(c) If V = θE [T (p∗1)] + c1, by deviating from the individual optimal strategy, the expected utility of
this SU will still be zero; hence, this SU also has no incentive to deviate from its current strategy.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since q(p1) : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is differentiable, according to the contraction mapping [37], the equilibrium
can be achieved and is stable for any starting point p01 ∈ [0, 1] if the following condition is satisfied
α
∣∣q′(p1)∣∣ < 1, ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1]. (68)
With q(p1) = FΘ
(
θ1(p1)
)
, we have
∣∣q′(p1)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣−fΘ(θ1(p1))θ1(p1)E′ [T (p1)]E [T (p1)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ maxθ∈[0,θup] fΘ(θ)θ
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ maxp1∈[0,1] E′ [T (p1)]E [T (p1)]
∣∣∣∣∣ = E′ [T (1)]E [T (1)] , (69)
where the third equality can be determined because maxθ∈[0,θup] fΘ(θ) θ = 1 and
E′[T (p1)]
E[T (p1)]
is a positive
and increasing function, which attains the maximum value at the upper boundary point p1 = 1. From
(68) and (69), we complete the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
If θ¯(p) < 0, from (49), the unique Nash equilibrium is
(
0, FΘ (θ
∗
2)
)
corresponding to the case of
exclusive-use monopoly analyzed in Section V.
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If θ¯(p) > θ∗2, since we have θ¯(pt) > θ¯(p) > θ∗2, ∀t according to (52), the unique Nash equilibrium
is
(
FΘ (θ1(p
∗
1)) , 0
)
corresponding to the case of shared-use monopoly analyzed in Section IV.
If 0 < θ¯(p) < θ∗2, we first focus on the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium as in Definition 6.
We define Ω(p1) , FΘ
(
θ¯(p1)
)−p1 for p1 ∈ [0, 1]. We can see that Ω(p1) is a strictly decreasing function
because FΘ(.) and θ¯(p1) are increasing and strictly decreasing functions, respectively, on their domains.
By Definition 6, p∗1 is an equilibrium if and only if it is a root of Ω(p1). Hence, it suffices to show that
Ω(p1) has a unique root on its domain. Based on the fact that
Ω(0) = FΘ
(
θ¯(0)
)
> 0, (70)
Ω(1) = FΘ
(
θ¯(1)
)− 1 < 0, (71)
and Ω(p1) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function, we see that Ω(p1) has a unique root p∗1 ∈ (0, 1).
Since p∗2 = FΘ (θ∗2) − FΘ
(
θ¯(p∗1)
)
only depends on the unique p∗1, it is clear that (p∗1, p∗2) is a unique
equilibrium of Definition 6. We next present that this (p∗1, p∗2) is a Nash equilibrium by showing that at
this point, no SU of any type θ can increase its utility by deviating from the individual optimal strategy
in Definition 5. We note that θ¯(p∗1) < θ∗2 because if θ¯(p∗1) > θ∗2, (51) shows a contradiction. Therefore,
with 0 < θ¯(p∗1) < θ∗2, we consider a specific type-θ SU
(a) If 0 < θ < θ¯(p∗1) < θ∗2, we have V − θE [T (p∗1)] − c1 > V − θE [X] − c2. Moreover, θ¯(p∗1) < θ∗2
leads to θ¯(p∗1) < θ1(p∗1), which shows that V − θE [T (p∗1)] − c1 > 0. Therefore, this SU has no
intention to deviate from the individual optimal strategy defined in Definition 5.
(b) If 0 < θ¯(p∗1) < θ < θ∗2, we have V − θE [T (p∗1)]− c1 < V − θE [X]− c2 and V − θE [X]− c2 >
0. Therefore, this SU has no intention to deviate from the individual optimal strategy defined in
Definition 5.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Since qd(p) : [0, 1]2 7→ [0, 1]2 is differentiable, according to the contraction mapping [37], the
equilibrium can be achieved and is stable for any initial (p01, p
0
2) if the following condition is satisfied
α‖q′d(p)‖ < 1, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]2, (72)
where q′d(p) is the Jacobian matrix of qd(p) and ‖.‖ is a matrix norm. Using the ∞-norm, (72) is
equivalent to
α
∣∣F ′Θ (θ¯(p1))∣∣ < 1, ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1]. (73)
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We have
∣∣F ′Θ (θ¯(p1))∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣−fΘ (θ¯(p1)) θ¯(p1) E′ [T (p1)]E [T (p1)]−E [X]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ maxθ∈[0,θup] fΘ(θ)θ
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ maxp1∈[0,1] E′ [T (p1)]E [T (p1)]−E [X]
∣∣∣∣∣
=
E′ [T (1)]
E [T (1)]−E [X] . (74)
From (73) and (74), we complete the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The revenue of O1 is
R1(c1, c2) = c1p
∗
1 = c1FΘ(θ¯(p
∗
1)) =
c1(c2 − c1)
θup
(
E [T (p∗1)]−E [X]
) . (75)
Maximizing above with respect to c1 by setting ∂R1∂c1 = 0, we obtain the best response of O1
BR1(c2) =
c2
2
. (76)
Similarly, the revenue of O2 is
R2(c1, c2) = c2p
∗
2 = c2
(
FΘ (θ
∗
2)− FΘ
(
θ¯(p∗1)
))
= c2
(
V − c2
θupE [X]
− c2 − c1
θup
(
E [T (p∗1)]−E [X]
)) . (77)
Maximizing above with respect to c2 by setting ∂R2∂c2 = 0, we obtain the best response of O2
BR2(c1) =
V
(
E [T (p∗1)]−E [X]
)
+ c1E [X]
2E [T (p∗1)]
. (78)
The Nash equilibrium strategy profile can be computed using the intersection of the best responses of
both operators as follows
c∗1 = BR1(BR2(c
∗
1)) =
V
(
E [T (p∗1)]−E [X]
)
4E [T (p∗1)]−E [X]
, (79)
c∗2 = 2c
∗
1. (80)
Substituting (79) and (80) into (53), we obtain
p~1 =
V
θup
(
4E
[
T (p~1 )
]−E [X]) . (81)
Using (8), the solution of the fixed-point equation (81) can be found and is equal to (61).
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Fig. 9. Convergence behaviors of the duopoly equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2) with three different price pair settings.
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